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RIDE-Kadrmas v. Dickin-

son Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988).
School bus transportation is an integral component of this
country's public education system.' Busing has also been employed as a tool to remedy constitutional violations and to secure
equal educational opportunities.2 Providing adequate busing,
however, poses several financial and practical difficulties for
school districts.' The problems are especially severe for sparsely
populated school districts. In these districts the students must be
bused great distances at substantial cost to the school district.4
To recompense this cost, some school districts charge families a
fee to bus their children to school while other districts do not
exact a fee for the same service. 5 In a recent decision, the
Supreme Court considered whether such a fee policy violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 6 In
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public School District,7 the Supreme Court held
that there was no constitutional violation where a student was
denied access to transportation because her family could not afford the fee."
In an attempt to provide superior educational facilities and
adequate transportation for children located in the less populated areas of the state, North Dakota encouraged school districts
to reorganize and consolidate into larger districts. 9 NotwithI See North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971) (citing
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)).
2 Swann v. Charlotte-MecKlenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971).
3 Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 402 N.W.2d 897, 900-01 (N.D. 1987)
(citing Seiler v. Gelhar, 209 N.W. 376, 379 (N.D. 1926)), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 2481
(1988).
4 Herman v. Medicine Lodge School Dist. No. 8, 71 N.W. 2d 323, 325 (N.D.
1955).
5 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.2-06.1 (1981 & Supp. 1987).
6 See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. School Dist., 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988). The
equal protection clause provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
law.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988).
8 Id. at 2487.
9 Id. at 2484. The North Dakota Legislature determined that larger school districts provide superior educational facilities for students. Herman v. Medicine
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standing the state's plan, Dickinson Public Schools, one of the
more populated public school districts, chose not to reorganize.' ° Moreover, North Dakota imposed no restriction as to the
manner of transportation adopted by nonreorganized school districts." l In 1973, Dickinson Public School District (Dickinson)
discontinued free "pick-up point" bus transportation for students in outlying regions' 2 and, following a referendum of Dickinson bus users,' 3 instituted the present policy of charging a fee
for door-to-door service.' 4 Six years later, in 1979, the North
Dakota Legislature endorsed Dickinson's policy by enacting a
statute which allowed school districts which have not reorganized
to assess a fee for the transportation of students to and from
school.' 5 This state statutory endorsement formed the basis of
Lodge School District No. 8, 71 N.W.2d 323, 328 (N.D. 1955). Because reorganization plans necessarily augment district size, the Court recognized that any reorganization must include the means of transportation to be employed. Kadrmas, 108 S.
Ct. at 2484. Furthermore, the majority noted that the transportation scheme as a
whole must be accepted by the voters of the proposed new district. Id. (citing N. D.
CENT. CODE § 15-27.3-10 (Supp. 1987)).
10 Id.
I I Id. at 2485.
12 Id. at 2484-85. Free bus service to outlying regions was terminated because
many of the pickup points were too far from the students' homes. Id.
13 Id. At the period relevant to this dispute approximately 13 percent of Dickinson students utilized school bus transportation. Id. at 2485.
14 Id. Pursuant to the door-to-door service program, students were driven to
and from their homes, as opposed to intermittent pick-up points which were used
in the previous route. Id. at 2484-85. In Dickinson, the charge for this door-todoor bus service was $97 per year for families with one child and $150 per year for
families with two children. Id. at 2485. This amount generated approximately 11
percent of the total cost to maintain the service. Id. Dickinson absorbed the balance of transportation cost. Id.
15 Id. The legislation which enabled nonreorganized districts to assess a transportation fee is the subject of equal protection scrutiny in this action. Id. The statute prescribes:
The school board of any school district which has not reorganized pursuant to chapter 15-15.1, may charge a fee for school bus service provided to anyone riding on buses provided by the school district. For
school bus service which was started prior to July 1, 1981, the total fees
collected may not exceed an amount equal to the difference between the
state transportation payment and the state average cost for transportation or the local district's cost, whichever is the lesser amount. For
schoolbus service started on or afterJuly 1, 1981, the total fees collected
may not exceed an amount equal to the difference between the state
transportation payment and the local school district's cost for transportation during the preceding school year. Any districts that have not previously provided transportation for pupils may establish charges based
on costs estimated by the school board during the first year that transportation is provided.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.2-06.1 (1981 & Supp. 1987).
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the constitutional challenge in Kadrmas.'6
Paula Kadrmas and her daughter Sarita, a Dickinson student,
lived approximately sixteen miles from the elementary school
that Sarita attended.' 7 Prior to 1985, the Kadrmas family paid
the fee for door-to-door service to bus Sarita to school.' 8 Because the family's annual income bordered on the poverty line,
they found it impossible to continue paying the fee.' 9 In 1985,
the Kadrmases refused to enter into an agreement to pay the fee
and consequently, the school district refused to transport Santa
to school. 2 ° During the years of 1985 to 1987, the Kadrmas family provided transportation for Sarita.2 ' In the spring 'of 1987,
Paula Kadrmas resumed using Dickinson bus service and continued to pay for the service through the next school year.2 2
In September of 1985, the Kadrmases filed an action in the
state court of North Dakota,23 seeking to enjoin Dickinson from
collecting a fee for door-to-door bus service.2 4 Following dismissal on the merits, the Kadrmases appealed to the Supreme Court
of North Dakota. 2 ' The state court rejected contentions that the
statute violated either the federal or the North Dakota Constitution. 26 The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction, 27 and affirmed the Supreme Court of North Dakota's
decision. 28 The Supreme Court held that the North Dakota busing statute was economically motivated and rationally related to a
legitimate governmental objective, and therefore, the statute did
not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.2 9
16
17
18

See Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2484.
Id. at 2485.

Id.

19 Id. At the time of trial, the Kadrmas family lived off the income of Mr.
Kadrmas, who worked sporadically in the oil fields of North Dakota. Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. During the years when the Kadrmases did not use Dickinson school buses,
they incurred $1,000 in expenses, ten times the amount charged by Dickinson. Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.

The original action also included Marsha Hall, a mother of children who
attended school in Dickinson. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 402 N.W.2d
897, 898 (N.D. 1987), aff'd 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988).
24 Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2485.
25 Id.
26 Id. The state court conclusively determined that article VIII, § 2, of the North
Dakota Constitution "does not require the state or school districts to provide free
transportation for students to and from school." Kadrmas, 402 N.W.2d at 902.
27 108 S. Ct. 63 (1987).
28 Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2491.
29 Id. at 2489.
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The Supreme Court first interpreted the equal protection
clause in the Slaughter-House Cases.3 0 In the Slaughter-House Cases
the Court applied the clause to a Louisiana statute that, in effect,
granted one slaughter-house a twenty-five year monopoly over
all meat business in New Orleans." The employees of the excluded slaughter-houses brought an action contending that the
act violated their right to equal protection.3 2 The Supreme
Court rejected this argument, holding that the fourteenth
amendment only protected "the newly emancipated negroes. 3 3
Despite the equal protection clause's initial limited interpretation
in Slaughter-House, the Supreme Court subsequently extended the
reach of the equal protection clause, 34 applying the clause to legislation that confined a specific class 35 or threatened a particular
right.

36

In 1942, the Court employed an equal protection analysis to
invalidate a statute that permitted certain criminals to be sterilized.3 7 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,38 the majority determined that the
right to procreate was one of the primary civil rights of man,
'3
"fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. 1
Due to the importance of the right involved, the Skinner Court
30

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).

31 See id. at 42-43.
32 Id. at 56. The claim alleged that the act deprived the butchers of New Orleans
"of the means by which they earn their daily bread." Id.
33 Id. at 81. The Supreme Court's decision in the Slaughter-House Cases represented the Court's primary reluctance to view the scope of the equal protection
clause liberally. See Note, Illegal Aliens Have Right to Free Public Education:Plyler v. Doe,
61 WASH. U.L.Q 591, 593 (1983).
34 For several decades following the decision in Slaughter-House, the equal protection clause remained largely dormant. Note, supra note 33, at 593. Recognizing
this latency, in 1927, Justice Holmes wrote that the equal protection clause "is the
usual last resort of constitutional arguments to point out shortcomings of this
sort." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (Virginia statute permitting mental
institutions to sterilize mentally retarded inmates not equal protection violation).
35 See, e.g., Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983) (illegitimate children); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (gender); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)
(resident aliens).
36 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to interstate travel);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to access the courts). See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969) (outlining the development of the equal protection clause).
37 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The statute enabled the state to
sterilize individuals that were found guilty, two or more times, of "felonies involving moral turpitude." Id. at 536.
38 316 U.S. 535.
39 Id. at 541.
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subjected the Oklahoma statute to strict judicial scrutiny." The
majority held that the statute was not necessarily related to a
compelling state interest because it permitted sterilization for
41
crimes not related to biologically inheritable traits.
Twelve years later, in Brown v. Board of Education4 2 the
Supreme Court applied an equal protection analysis to evaluate
segregation in public schools, acknowledging the central role
that education plays in our society.4 3 Providing the cornerstone
by which cases concerning a student's access to education will be
adjudicated, Chief Justice Warren posited that a child who is denied the opportunity to receive an education will have little hope
for prosperity. 44 Relying on this concept, the Court determined
40

Id.

Id. The strict scrutiny standard of review set forth in Skinner was also applied
to legislative distinctions that involve suspect classes. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429 (1984) (lower courts' denial of custody to mother solely because she
co-habitated with negro held erroneous); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)
(statute that prevented inter-racial marriages was unconstitutional); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (legislation that permitted evacuation and detention of Japanese-American citizens because of their race passed strict scrutiny
analysis). To satisfy strict scrutiny review, the classification must be necessary to
41

further a compelling state interest. L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 16-

6, at 1451 (1988). See also Rodgers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982) (system of
at-large voting districts held invalid).
Cases that do not involve a fundamental right or a suspect class will receive
lower scrutiny. L. TRIBE, supra, § 16-2, at 1439. Most classifications are prone to
the minimum standard of review. Id. These cases involve economic or social distinctions, and must only be rationally related to a permissible governmental objective. Id. at 1439. See, e.g., Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980);
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336
U.S. 106 (1949).
The Court has also developed an intermediate standard. L. TRIBE, supra, § 1624, at 1556. This middle level scrutiny is usually applied to classifications dealing
with gender and illegitimacy. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Pickett v.
Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983). Legislative distinctions affecting these groups must be
substantially related to an important governmental goal. Craig, 429 U.S. at 204.
42 347 U.S. 483.
4"3

Id. at 493.

44

Id. Specifically, Justice Warren stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of
the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in
the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service
in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,
in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to
adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has
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that the "separate but equal" doctrine 45 did not apply to public
educational facilities. 46 Therefore, public school students who
were segregated into different educational facilities on the basis
of race were denied equal access to an education.47
While the Brown opinion articulated the importance of education, the Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 4 8 subsequently refused to elevate that holding by
recognizing education as a fundamental right. 49 In Rodriguez, the

parents of children who attended school in San Antonio brought
a class action on behalf of the students,5" challenging Texas'
method of funding public school education. 5 ' The parents contended that fewer funds were expended on poorer districts, and
therefore, their children were denied equal opportunity for an
education. Justice Powell, writing for the Rodriguez majority,
first determined that the scheme did not operate to the detriment
of a suspect class.13 The Court then held that despite its imporundertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all
on equal terms.
Id.
45 The "separate but equal" doctrine first appeared in Plessey v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessey, the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana statute that required separate but equal accommodations for blacks and whites. Id. at 550-51.
The Court determined that this statute did not violate the fourteenth amendment.
Id.
46 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
47 Id. The separate accommodations were not equal even though many of the
discernible factors, such as the physical facilities, may have been comparable. Id.
The Court resolved that separating students solely due to their race would spawn
beliefs of inferiority. Id. These beliefs could have an irreversible influence on the
hearts and minds of the students. Id. at 493-94.
48 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
49 Id. at 35.
50 Id. at 4-5. The members of the class included minority school children who
are poor and live in school districts that have lower property tax bases. Id. at 5.
51 Id. at 15 n.38. This scheme essentially relied on ad valorem local property
taxes. Id. The plan resulted in greater expenditures per pupil to affluent districts
that paid higher property taxes. Id. Conversely, the impoverished districts that
paid comparatively less property taxes received proportionately smaller renumerations for education. Id.
52 See id. at 25.
53 Id. at 28. The Court distinguished the instant matter from prior holdings
where the Supreme Court invalidated statutes which denied fundamental rights.
See id. at 20-22 (citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (right to run for political office); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel on appeal); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to trial transcript)).
The Court resolved that the wealth classification "is not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
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tance, education should not be classified as a fundamental
right.5 4 Because education is not explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, the majority reasoned that it was not
within the Court's dominion to afford it such status.5 5 The majority, utilizing the lowest level of review, adjudged that the financing scheme did not violate the equal protection clause
because the scheme was rationally related to a necessary governmental end.5 6
In 1981, the Supreme Court determined the appropriate
standard of review for cases which entirely denied education to a
certain class.5 7 In Plyler v. Doe,58 the plaintiffs challenged a Texas
statute which denied free education to children illegally residing
in this country.59 While referring to its previous ruling in Rodriguez, the Court stressed that education serves an important function. 60 The majority contemplated the effect that a complete
denial of education would have on this class of children. 6 ' Because of the important interest at stake, the Court held that
protection from the majoritarian political process," and therefore, it was not a suspect classification. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. Thus, the Court determined that a
wealth distinction, absent the presence of a fundamental right, was not enough to
invoke strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 29.
54 Id. at 30. The Rodriguez Court stated:
The key to discovering whether education is "fundamental" is not to be
found in the comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by
weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel.
Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
Id. at 33-34.
55 Id. at 35. Further, the Court reasoned that the fact that education is imperative to the effective discharge of other rights is immaterial. Id.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall disagreed with the test that the majority advanced to conclude that education is not a fundamental right. Id. at 103
(Marshall, J., dissenting). He stated that the test should be the interrelationship
that the interest has with rights that are explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
Id.
56 See id. at 28-29.
57 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1982).
58 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
59 Id. at 205. The statute specifically withheld state funds for the education of
the children of illegal aliens and permitted schools to deny admittance to these
children. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon 1987).
60 Plyer, 457 U.S. at 223. The Court stated that education is not "merely some
governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation." Id. at 221.
61 Id. at 223. Due to the importance of education, the Court declined to adjudicate the issue solely on the basis of whether the statute withheld a fundamental
right, or whether a suspect class was being discriminated against. Id.
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heightened scrutiny was appropriate.6 2 Therefore, the statute
would be considered valid only if it furthered a substantial state
goal. 6 3 The Court concluded that the State's objectives were insufficient to support the denial of education to these students.6 4
Prior to Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public School District,6 5 the
Supreme Court refused to recognize education as a fundamental
right. 6 6 The Court, however, established that legislation which
denied a certain class complete access to education will receive
heightened scrutiny.6 7 In Kadrmas, the Court refused to apply the
rational of Plyler to a school bus user fee.6 8 In so doing, the
Court held that a denial of transportation is not comparable to a
complete denial of access to an education.6 9
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Kadrmas, began
her analysis of the merits7" by rejecting the Kadrmas' contention
that the fee imposed by Dickinson for the bus service deprived
indigent children of "minimum access to education."'" The
Court found that Sarita remained in school during the period
that she was deprived of bus transportation, and therefore, she
was not denied education.7 2 The Court interpreted the Kadrmas'
attack on the busing fee as a barrier to an education for the poor
as opposed to a complete deprivation of education.7 3
62

Id.

at

224.

Id.
64 Id. at 230.
65 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988).
66 See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1972).
67 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 224 (1981).
618 Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2488.
69 Id.
70 Justice O'Connor refused to dismiss the action on procedural grounds. Id. at
2486-87. The Court rejected Dickinson's position that the Kadrmas' were estopped from proceeding with their claims because they enjoyed the benefits of the
bus service after instituting this action. Id. at 2486. The majority surmised that
plaintiffs are not forbidden to challenge an act because they are receiving some
benefit from it. Id. Moreover, the Court determined that the fee was a burden as
opposed to a benefit. Id.
The Court also disagreed with the school district's view that the execution of
the busing contracts caused the case to be moot. Id. at 2486-87. The Court reasoned that there existed a present tangible controversy between the parties. Id. A
decision in the Kadrmas' favor could exempt them from paying the amount owing
on the 1987 contracts. Id.
71 Id. at 2487 (quoting Brief for Appellants at i, Kad-mas, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988)
(No. 86-7113)).
72 Id.
73 Id. Specifically, the majority stated:
Appellants must therefore mean to argue that the busing fee unconstitutionally places a greater obstacle to education in the path of the poor
than it does in the path of wealthier families. Alternatively, appellants
63
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The majority asserted that they were disinclined to apply a
strict or heightened standard of review in light of their interpretation that Sarita Kadrmas had not been denied an education."4
The Court recapitulated their view that statutes discriminating
on the basis of wealth alone will not be exposed to strict equal
protection scrutiny. 75 Moreover, the majority reasoned that education is not recognized as a fundamental right, and therefore,
strict scrutiny is not appropriate when a state encroaches on an
individual's access to education.7 6
The Court next addressed the argument that the statute
should be open to heightened scrutiny in a manner similar to the
analysis set forth in Plyler.77 The Court noted that the Plyler holding has not been extended beyond the unique circumstances of
that case. 78 Distinguishing Plyler from the facts of Kadrmas, the
Court noted that unlike the children in Plyler, Sarita Kadrmas had
not been punished by the state for the illegal conduct of her parents. 79 The majority reasoned that Kadrmas was only denied the
right to use the school bus because her parents did not agree to
pay the fee for the service. 80 Further, unlike the statute challenged in Plyler, the user fee could in no way be deemed to
"promot[e] the creation and perpetuation of a sub-class of illiterates within our boundaries, surely adding to the problems and
costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime."-8' To substantiate
this position the Court quoted the North Dakota statute that permitted the school board to waive any fee that the parents could
not afford to pay. 82 Thus, because Plyler was easily distinguished,
may mean to suggest that the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively requires government to provide free transportation to school, at least for
some class of students that would include Sarita Kadrmas.
Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.

(citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1980); Ortwein v. Schwab,
410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973)).
76 Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284 (1986); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 284 (1982); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16
(1973)).
77 Id.
78

Id. at 2488 (quoting P/y/er, 457 U.S. at 239 (Powell, J., concurring)).

79 Id.

Id.
Id. (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230 (Powell, J., concurring)).
Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-43-11.2 (1981) (in pertinent part, the statute states: "[a school] board may waive any fee if any pupil or his parent or guardian shall be unable to pay such fees. No pupil's rights or privileges, including the
receipt of grades or diplomas, may be denied or abridged for nonpayment of
fees.")).
80
81
82
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the Court did not apply the middle level scrutiny advanced in
Plyler.8 3 The Court was also disinclined to expand the rational of
Plyler to the circumstances in Kadrmas. 4
The majority then considered the contention that North Dakota withheld important benefits from those who were not able to
pay for them.8 5 The majority found that the Kadrmas' reliance
on cases including Griffin v. Illinois 6 was inappropriate.8 7 The
Court distinguished Griffin and like cases which involved requirements that barred indigent litigants access to the courts in situations where no alternative to litigation was available.8 8 The
Kadrrnas majority reasoned that, unlike Griffin, North Dakota did
not possess a monopoly on the method of getting children to
school.8 9 Because alternate means of transportation were available to the Kadrmas family, the Court held that the equal protection clause had not been violated.9 °
The Court therefore held that the minimal standard of equal
protection review would be appropriate. 9 ' Justice O'Connor espoused three factors that demonstrated that the statute was constitutionally permissible under this standard.9 2 First, Justice
O'Connor postulated that the fact that bus service is not required
at all by the Constitution supported the proposition that the ser83

Id.

84

Id.

Id.
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
87 Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2488. The Kadrmases also cited to Smith v.Bennett,
365 U.S. 708 (1961) (filing fee required for application for writ of habeas corpus
denied equal protection), Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (indigent
barred from divorce because of failure to pay court fees denied equal protection)
and Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (posting of bond required for appeals of
certain landlord-tenant cases violated right to equal protection). Kadrmas, 108 S.
Ct. at 2488.
85
86

88 Id.
89

Id.

90 Id. The Court concluded:

[U]nlike the complaining parties in all the cases cited by appellants, the
Kadrmas family could and did find a private alternative to the public
school bus service for which Dickinson charged a fee. That alternative
was more expensive, to be sure, and we have no reason to doubt that
genuine hardships were endured by the Kadrmas family when Sarita was
denied access to the bus. Such facts, however, do not imply that the
Equal Protection Clause has been violated.
Id.
91 Id. at 2489. Under the minimum standard of review the "statute is upheld if it
bears a rational relation to a legitimate governmental objective." Id.
92 Id.
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vice need not be offered for free.93 Second, the majority determined that there was a legitimate state purpose in encouraging
school districts to furnish bus transportation.9 4 Finally, the
Court reasoned, that requiring schools to fund the full expense
of the bus service
would deter school districts from providing
9 5
transportation.
The majority next addressed the contention that the user fee
violated the Kadrmas' equal protection rights even if the Court
applied the minimal standard of review.9 6 The Court considered
the Kadrmas' assertion that the statute was unconstitutional because it permitted the imposition of a user fee only in school districts that have chosen not to reorganize. 7 The Court refused to
rule that this distinction alone would prove that the statute was
not rational." To support this proposition the majority reiterated the well established principal that the equal protection
clause would not invalidate a statute because it is limited to a
specific geographical area. 99 Justice O'Connor stated that the
fourteenth amendment would be violated only if the geographical classification was not related to the achievement of the governmental objective.' 0 0 The Court also noted that a presumption
of rationality followed all social and economic legislation.' 0 ' The
Court determined that this presumption would only be surmounted by a plain showing of arbitrariness.'0 2
Advancing the minimum standard of review, the majority
recognized that it was the burden of the attacking party to show
the statute was irrational and arbitrary.'0 3 The Court then determined that the Kadrmases failed to carry this heavy burden. 0 4 In
so concluding, the Court relied on the North Dakota Supreme

94

Id.
Id.

95
96

Id.
Id.

97

Id.

93

98 Id.
99 Id. (quoting Fort Smith Light Co. v. Paving Dist., 274 U.S. 387, 391 (1927)).
100 Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Kotch v. Board

of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947)).
101 Id. (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981)).
102 Id.
The Court held that statutes will not be overturned "unless the varying
treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any
combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's
actions were irrational." Id. (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
103
104

Id. at 2490.
Id.
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Court's holding on the purpose of the statute. 0 5 The majority
accepted the state, court's determination that the purpose of the
statute, which treated reorganized and nonreorganized school
districts differently, was to promote school district reorganization.' 0 6 The majority determined that the reasoning of the state
court, the school district, 10 7 and the state of North Dakota 10 8 was
sufficient to rebut the Kadrmas' argument.' 0 9 Justice O'Connor
additionally offered the Court's analysis of the difference between the treatment of reorganized and nonreorganized school
districts.''o In the case of nonreorganized school districts, the
Court stated that "local school boards may impose a bus service
user fee on their own authority, while the direct approval of the

voters would be required in reorganized districts."'"

The ma-

jority concluded that the different treatment of reorganized and
nonreorganized districts was not sufficient to render the statute
12
arbitrary or irrational.'
In dissent, Justice Marshall perceived the Court's holding in
Kadrmas as a continued retreat from the commitment of equal educational opportunity." 3 He restated the concern he set forth in
his dissenting opinion in Rodriguez.' 14 Justice Marshall believed
that the Court should not condone discrimination against the indigent with respect to education which he identified as "perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments."' '5
Id.
Id. The Supreme Court specifically noted the state court's determination that
"[t]he legislation provide[d] incentive for the people to approve school district reorganization by alleviating parental concerns regarding the costs of student transportation in the reorganized district." Id. (quoting Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public
Schools, 402 N.W.2d 897, 903 (N.D. 1987), aff'd 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988)).
107 Id. at 2490. The Court also accepted the more elaborate explanation given by
the school district. Id. The district's position alleged that the statute was in no way
related to the reorganization of school districts. Id. The purpose, under Dickinson's theory, was to have those who use the bus service recompense a modest portion of the cost. Id.
108 The Court determined that the State's explanation was similar to that of the
school district's. Id. at 2490.
105

106

109 Id. at 2490-91.
11o Id. at 2491.
I''
112
113
114

Id.

Id.
Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. In Rodriguez, Justice Marshall "wrote that the Court's holding was a 'retreat from our historic commitment to equality of educational opportunity and [an]
unsupportable acquiescence in a system which deprives children in their earliest
years of the chance to reach their full potential.' " Id. (quoting San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 71 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
''5 Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
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The dissent questioned the manner in which the Court addressed the case." 6 He noted that the majority viewed the North
Dakota statute from the perspective of a denial of transportation. 1 7 Justice Marshall perceived that the Court was then free
to conclude that there was no denial of education, only a refusal
to permit students to utilize the bus service without payment of
the fee." 8
The Court's "facile analysis," in Justice Marshall's opinion,
forgot that the fourteenth amendment "is concerned with 'sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination.' 119 Justice Marshall interpreted the case as involving
governmental action that hampered the poor in their pursuit of
an education. 120 He reasoned that children who live a great distance from school can only obtain public education if adequate
transportation is available. 12 ' Thus, Justice Marshall determined
that the imposition of a fee for bus service for students in the
Kadrmas' position had the same practical effect as imposing a fee
directly on education. 12 2 Further, the dissent reasoned that the
fee discriminated against the Kadrmases because it was more of a
burden for the poor in North Dakota than it was for wealthier
families. 23 Justice Marshall determined that the issue in this case
was whether North Dakota may enact a statute that "discrimi124
nate[d] against the poor in providing access to education."'
Justice Marshall then repeated what he believed to be the
proper examination of equal protection claims. 1 25 The inquiry,
according to Justice Marshall, should not be premised on choosing the proper label to categorize a claim.' 26 Rather, the dissent
recommended that the Court identify and analyze the character
116 Id.

117 Id.
118 Id. Justice Marshall also noted:

The Court therefore does not address the question whether a State constitutionally could deny a child access to a minimally adequate education. In prior cases, this Court explicitly has left open the question
whether such a deprivation of access would violate a fundamental constitutional right. That question remains open today.
Id. at 2491 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
119 Id. at 2491-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268, 275 (1939)).
120 Id. at 2492 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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of the classification, the true interests at stake and the rationale
behind the state action. 2 1 In this light, Justice Marshall determined that the North Dakota statute violated the equal protec28
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Justice Marshall determined that the statute discriminated
on the grounds of economic status. '2" The Justice recognized
that the Court refused to view economic classifications as suspect.'" ' He noted, however, that the Court had frequently invalidated statutes which disfavor the poor. ' 3 ' In Justice Marshall's
view, the Court has not favored policies that burden indigents'
access to governmental benefits which might enable them to improve their status. 32 According to the dissent, the North Dakota
statute impaired indigents ability to improve their circumstances,
and therefore, Justice Marshall required the Court to apply "ex33
acting scrutiny." 1
Justice Marshall's dissent then addressed the importance of
the interest at stake.' 3 4 His analysis found that the statute burdened an indigent's interest in education. 1 35 Citing to Brown and
Plyler, Justice Marshall observed the vital role that education
plays in our society. 13 6 He reasoned that the holding in Plyler,
which recognized the importance of education, was directly applicable to the North Dakota statute at issue in Kadrmas. 137 Justice Marshall opined that the fact that Plyler involved a
classification based upon alienage did not necessarily distinguish
Id. Specifically, Justice Marshall wrote:
[T]he Court should focus on "the character of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated
against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the
asserted state interests in support of the classification."
Id. (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
128 Id.
127

129

Id.

130

Id.

131 Id. (citing Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134

(1972); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). Justice Marshall recognized that the
Court will usually invalidate such statutes when they bar indigent's access to the
judicial and political process. Id.
132 Id. at 2493 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133 Id. Justice Marshall reasoned that "[wihen state action has the predictable
tendency to entrap the poor and create a permanent underclass" the intent of the
fourteenth amendment is frustrated. Id.
134 Id.

135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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the two cases.' 3 8 He perceived the holding in Plyler to rest upon
the Texas statute's "differential treatment of a discrete and disadvantaged group of children with respect to the provision of education."' 9 As in Plyler, Justice Marshall asserted that North
Dakota legislated to hinder the educational opportunities of a deprived group of children who required an education to succeed
in society.' 4 °
The dissent next turned to the rationale for the policy of
charging a user fee for bus service.' 4 ' Justice Marshall noted that
North Dakota permitted school districts, such as Dickinson, to
charge the fee in order to recover a portion of the costs of the
bus service. 142 He reasoned that the money collected from indigent families represented only a small portion of the total cost of
the bus service, and therefore, exempting indigent families from
this fee would not significantly affect the funding or operation of
the bus service.'4 3 Injustice Marshall's opinion, North Dakota's
interest was insubstantial and did not justify the discriminatory
effect of the challenged statute. 1 44 Justice Marshall viewed the
Court's holding as overlooking the indigent's need for unbridled
access to an adequate education. 145
In a separate opinion, Justice Stevens dissented on the basis
that North Dakota lacked any rational basis to enact the user fee
statute. 146 He agreed with Justice Marshall's identification of the
resulting harm to the disadvantaged class who could not afford
the fee.' 4 7 Justice Stevens also accepted the North Dakota
Supreme Court's explanation of the purpose behind the statute.1 48 The Justice considered the state legislature's two pur138

139
140

141
142

143
144
145

Id.
Id.

Id. at 2494 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Justice Marshall concluded:
For the poor, education is often the only route by which to become full
participants in our society. In allowing a state to burden the access of
poor persons to an education, the Court denies equal opportunity and
discourages hope. I do not believe the Equal Protection Clause countenances such a result.

Id.
146

Id. at 2494 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun joined in this dissent.

Id.
147
148

Id.
Id.
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poses in enacting the statute. 49 First, Justice Stevens
determined that the State's attempt to alleviate parental concerns
regarding the costs of student transportation by encouraging reorganization showed that the state realized that free bus transportation was a vital element of public education in a scarcely
populated state.' 5 0 Otherwise, injustice Stevens' view, a significant number of parents would not have been motivated to vote
for a reorganization plan.' 5 ' Second, because the voters had a
substantial amount of time to consider whether to choose reorganization,15 there was no reason to permit the imposition of the
15 3
user fee in those districts which had chosen not to reorganize.
Thus, Justice Stevens resolved that the North Dakota statute
lacked the elements of legitimacy needed for it to be considered
rational. 154
In light of the manner in which the majority analyzed
Kadrmas, the decision was sound. Education is not a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution. Moreover, statutes that
discriminate on the basis of wealth alone have not been considered suspect.' 55 Under the Kadrmas analysis, the statute need
only satisfy the minimal scrutiny level of review. Although the
reasoning of the Court's decision, as applied, is not questioned,
the way in which the Court framed the issue can be challenged.
The Court refused to accept the argument that the fee for
the bus service deprived Kadrmas of "minimum access to education."1 56 Because Kadrmas remained in school during the period
she was deprived of access to the bus, the Court determined that
"appellants must therefore mean to argue" that the North Dakota statute placed a greater barrier to an education for the
poor. 1 57 This "facile analysis," as Justice Marshall's dissent asserted, is inadequate in light of the facts presented.' 5 ' The stat149

Id.

Id. at 2494-95 (StevensJ., dissenting).
Id. at 2495 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
152 Id.Justice Stevens noted that the majority recognized that the state legislature
had encouraged this reorganization since 1947. Id. (citing Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at
2484).
153 Id. at 2495 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Justice Steven's view "there is no
longer any justification at all for allowing the nonreorganized districts to place an
obstacle in the paths of poor children seeking an education in some parts of the
State that has been removed in other parts of the State." Id.
150

151

'154

Id.

155

See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972).
Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2487.

156

157
158

Id.

Id. at 2491 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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ute compelled a family that lived sixteen miles from school to pay
a fee to bus their child to school. 1 59 It is difficult to discern the
Court's reasoning that this fee is not identical, in practical effect,
to placing a fee directly on education. 160 Thus, by placing a
heavier burden on the Kadrmases, who could not afford to pay
the fee, the statute discriminated
against indigents' access to
6
state educational facilities.'

1

The Court's cursory treatment of Plyler must also be drawn
into question. The majority refused to apply the middle level
scrutiny used in Plyler to the Kadrmas situation on the basis that
the two cases were distinguishable. 62 The Court reasoned that
Sarita Kadrmas was denied transportation to school because "her
parents would not agree to pay" the fee. 163 Thus, the Court determined that, unlike the children in Plyler, Sarita Kadrmas was
not being punished for the illegal conduct of her parents. 64
Here, the Court appeared to forget the essence of the controversy. First, the Kadrmases did not refuse to pay the user fee as a
matter of choice. Rather, they did not pay the fee because they
could not afford it. Second, under the North Dakota statute,
Sarita Kadrmas was being punished for her parents financial situation, which was in no way related to illegal conduct. The holding of Plyler should not be distinguished and, in fact, the analysis
should be extended to cover the situation in Kadrmas.
The Court also cited to the North Dakota "waiver" statute 165
in further support of its position that the user fee could not be
considered to "promote the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries." 166 The presence of
this statute should have no bearing on this action. The statute
permitted the board to waive a fee if the parent cannot pay. The
statute did not require such action by the board. 167 The existence of this waiver did not modify the ultimate effect of the user
159 Id. at

2485.

See id. at 2492 (Marshall, J,. dissenting).
161 See id.
162 Id. at 2487.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 2488.
165 N. D. CENT. CODE § 15-43-11.2 (1981). See supra note 82 for pertinent text of
the statute.
166 Kadrnas, 108 S. Ct. at 2488 (quoting Plyler v.Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 239 (1982)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
167 The appellants, in fact, stated that "no waiver has ever been granted in the
fifteen years the Dickinson busing fee has existed. Nor has anyone's income ever
been considered in the imposition of the busing fee." Reply brief for Appellant at
2,Kadrnas, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988) (No. 86-7113).
160
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fee, which was the denial of bus transportation to those who
could not afford it.
It is difficult to comprehend how the Kadrmas majority could
interpret, in such a finite manner, a case that involved an entitlement the Supreme Court previously considered to be "perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments.' 6
Justice Marshall recognized the Court's continued retreat from
the commitment of equal educational opportunity. 169 A retreat
that now includes the proclamation that a student is not considered to be denied access to an education when she cannot afford
to reach the schoolhouse gate.
Robert Anthony Burke
168 Kadrmas, 108 S. Ct. at 2488 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954)).
169 Id. at 2491 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

